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COMMENT
SOUTHWORTH V. GREBE: THE CONSERVATIVE
UTILIZATION OF "NEGATIVE" FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS TO ATTACK DIVERSITY OF THOUGHT AT
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
"It were not best that we should all think alike; it is difference of
opinion that makes horse-races."'
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is
popularly celebrated for its protection of free speech, the cor-
nerstone of academic thought. Unfortunately, a right-wing
legal attack on the University of Wisconsin-Madison's ("UWM")
mandatory student fee program has utilized the same First
Amendment to squelch the extracurricular debate that makes
the university a "marketplace of ideas."2 In Southworth v.
Grebe,' the Alliance Defense Fund ("ADF")4, a conservative
MARK TWAIN, PUDDNIEAD WILSON 115 (Bantam Books 1984) (1894) (from
Puddn'head Wilson's Calendar).
2 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (Brennan, J.)
("The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.'").
3 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 157 F.3d 1124, cert. granted, 119
S. Ct. 1332 (Mar. 29, 1999).
' See Eric Brakken, Right-Wing Unleashes Campaign Against Student Activi-
ties, INFUSION: THE NATIONAL MAGAZINE FOR PROGRESSIVE STUDENT ACTIVISTS,
Oct. 1998, at 13. Southworth is one lawsuit in a larger effort to "de-fund the left."
Id. ADF currently has a nearly identical lawsuit pending against the University of
Minnesota. See id.
ADF's activity is expected to increase in the next year. In an interview
with the Minnesota Daily, Fund President Alan Sears pledged that ADF
will file suit against six colleges in the next year and spend half a mil-
lion dollars on the issue. They hope that their investment will result in
a ruling by the Supreme Court.
Id. In fact, the Regents appealed the Southworth ruling to the United States Su-
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legal organization, mounted a clever attack on UWM's manda-
tory fee program by relying on a body of First Amendment case
law that ensures individuals' "negative," or "corollary," speech
and association rights.' These "negative" rights of the First
Amendment are the inverse of the affirmative speech and
association guarantees most often equated with the Constitu-
tion. "Negative" First Amendment rights have evolved, mostly
in the area of labor law,6 to protect individuals from gov-
ernment-compelled speech and association, essentially guaran-
teeing corollary rights not to speak or to associate. Couched
in language heralding individual freedoms, the ADF
mounted an attack on diverse student debate by employ-
ing this body of "negative" First Amendment case law to a
paradoxical conclusion.
In Southworth, the ADF represented three UWM students,
"self described members of the extreme Christian Right,"' in a
lawsuit challenging the Wisconsin Board of Regents' ("Board of
Regents" or "Regents") funding of eighteen left-leaning student
organizations with mandatory activity fees. The conservative,
or "objecting,"' students claimed that the Regents had violated
their "negative" First Amendment rights not to speak and
associate by allocating a portion of their mandatory activity
fees to student-run "political and ideological" organizations to
preme Court, which granted certiorari, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (Mar. 29, 1999), proving
ADF's investment on this issue a worthwhile one. For more information about the
activities of the ADF, including a list sampling the cases that have come before
the United States Supreme Court with the ADF's Assistance, visit their website at
<www.alliancedefensefund.org>.
See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Chicago Teacher's
Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and
Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes, 466 U.S. 435
(1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); see also Victor
Brudney, Association, Advocacy and The First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1, 11 (1995) ("Individuals may be said to have a negative speech inter-
est-i.e., an interest in remaining silent and not being forced or 'improperly' pres-
sured to speak.").
6 See supra note 5.
Brakken, supra note 4, at 13.
8 The court refers to the conservative students in Southworth as "objecting
students" because they disagree with the political and ideological views of the
liberal organizations funded by their mandatory student activity fees. Southworth,
151 F.3d at 720. This Comment also refers to the conservative students as "object-
ing students."
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which they were morally and ideologically opposed.9 Convinced
of a traditional First Amendment triumph, a three judge panel
of the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the objecting students,
holding that the Regents had violated the objecting students'
speech rights by allocating a portion of the mandatory fees
to the so-called "liberal" student groups.'0  As a result,
the Southworth holding yields grave political, legal and
educational results.
A "robust exchange of ideas"" is fundamental to all edu-
cational institutions and the democracy that they protect. Uni-
versities play a vital role in encouraging the "robust exchange
of ideas" and developing the discourse that informs democratic
choice. 2 "[Tlhe nation's fundamental civic values are forged in
the intellectual fires of its college campuses .. . ."" According-
ly, the UWM broadly aims, "to discover and disseminate
knowledge, to extend knowledge and its application beyond the
boundaries of its campuses and to serve and stimulate society
by developing in students heightened intellectual, cultural and
humane sensitivities .. .. "" Regrettably, the UWM's mission
was significantly frustrated by the Seventh Circuit decision in
Southworth. The ruling complicates and renders impractical
the continuance of the UWM's support and encouragement of
extracurricular political and ideological debate among student
groups of various political and religious affiliations. Without
sufficient funding, the student organizations which foster the
"diverse debate" that is critical to the university's educational
mission will largely cease to exist, leaving only a more uniform
and colorless educational institution.
' Southworth, 151 F.3d at 718.
'0 Id. at 733.
" See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust ex-
change of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues . ").
2 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 684 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (holding that a
professor's contempt conviction for his refusal to respond to inquiries concerning
his political affiliations and the content of his lectures was an invasion of the
professor's academic freedom and political expression.) ("Teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturi-
ty and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.").
13 Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 527 (Cal. 1993) (Arabi-
an, J., dissenting).
11 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.01(2) (West 1998).
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Politically, the Southworth decision encourages well-fund-
ed 5 conservative organizations like the ADF to initiate law
suits aiming to silence the viewpoints of left-leaning organiza-
tions. The decision demonstrates how a conservative legal
organization can utilize the federal courts, and the discourse of
individual rights, to effect an anti-democratic purpose: the de-
funding of political and social groups which foster ideologies
inimical to its own.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's analysis failed to offer a
cogent standard for reviewing the constitutionality of mandato-
ry fee expenditures at public universities. The court did not
clearly articulate whether the Regents' allocation of mandatory
student fees to political and ideological groups could be justi-
fied by a "vital", "legitimate" or "important" interest in educa-
tion. Likewise, in a patently legalistic manner, the court fo-
cused only on the impact of the fee program on the objecting
students and never considered the devastating practical effects
its ruling would have on the student organizations relying on
the funding. 6 Furthermore, the court relied on the "negative"
First Amendment doctrine, which evolved mostly in the context
of labor law, rendering it inapplicable and largely inapposite to
the university setting.
Southworth presents the problem of dueling First Amend-
ment interests: the proscription of compelled funding of speech
and association and the protection of uninhibited expression.
The "negative" First Amendment absolutes,17 forged largely in
the labor context unfold significant contradictions when im-
ported into the educational setting. The result is an Amend-
ment that steps on its own toes, as demonstrated in
Southworth by the clever but troublesome use of the First
" Brakken, supra note 4, at 13. ADF is listed as maintaining an annual bud-
get of $5 million, with half a million dollars to spend on this issue. See id.
16 Moreover, notably, traditional, positive First Amendment guarantees apply to
public universities and protect the speech rights of the left-leaning ("political and
ideological") student organizations. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (hold-
ing that student groups were protected by the First Amendment); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that students'
First Amendment right to protest the Vietnam War was only forbidden once the
protest "substantially and materially" interfered with discipline).
1 See Smith, 844 P.2d at 533 (Arabian, J., dissenting) ("I acknowledge that the
resolution of conflicting interests that I have set forth may not satisfy those who
prefer First Amendment absolutes.").
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Amendment to effectively silence the exchange of diverse view-
points that the amendment aims to protect.
Part I of this Comment details the cases that form the
"negative" speech and association rights doctrine, setting the
backdrop for the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Southworth.
Part II discusses the Southworth decision. Part III examines
the fundamental problems with the Seventh Circuit's analysis
in Southworth. Lastly, Part IV considers, in light of
Southworth, the plausible arguments left to defend the consti-
tutionality of the allocation of mandatory student fees to po-
litical and ideological campus groups.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND MANDATORY FEE CASES
While the greater part of First Amendment case law re-
specting the guarantees of speech and association considers the
limits on government abridgment of these guarantees, there is
a corollary body of case law that recognizes the "negative"
rights of an individual not to speak or associate." These "neg-
ative" rights insure "individual freedom of mind,"9 which is
in turn justified by three canonical First Amendment princi-
ples: guarding "'truth' in the 'marketplace of ideas,' facilitating
representative democracy and self-government, and promoting
individual autonomy, self-expression and self-fulfillment."'
While the rights not to speak and not to associate are not ex-
pressly guaranteed by the First Amendment,2 they have
evolved as ancillary speech rights.2
" See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Keller v. State Bar
of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); see also Brudney supra note 5, at 11.
19 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 ("The right to speak and the right to refrain
from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual
freedom of mind.'"); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
20 GERALD GUNTHER, KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1025 (13th
ed. 1997); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at
576 (1978).
2, The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'" See GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 1361; see also Southworth v. Grebe, 151
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A. The Right Not To Speak
A study of the "negative" rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment necessarily begins in 1943 with West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette,2 3 where the United States
Supreme Court declared that a school board resolution compel-
ling all students to salute and pledge their allegiance to the
American flag was unconstitutional.' Walter Barnette, a
Jehovah's Witness, challenged the constitutionality of the
forced salute and pledge, claiming that it infringed on his reli-
gious belief that the flag is a "graven image" within the com-
mand of the Book of Exodus.' The Court found that
Barnette's right to dissent outweighed the nationalism the
school board sought to imbue.2" Thus, the Court held that the
compelled salute "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Consti-
tution to reserve from all official control."27 Justice Jackson,
in an oft-quoted sentence, poetically began the construction of
"negative" speech rights under the First Amendment:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.28
Later constitutional challenges looked to this "fixed star"
to enjoin government compulsion of speech and association. In
Wooley v. Maynard,29 plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Maynard sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against the enforcement of a
F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 157 F.3d 1124, cert. granted, 119 S.
Ct. 1332 (Mar. 29, 1999) ("The Supreme Court has long recognized two necessary
corollaries to the First Amendments guarantee of free speech: the right not to
speak; and the right not to be compelled to subsidize others' speech.") (citations
omitted).
319 U.S. 624 (1943). Three years before Barnette, the Supreme Court sus-
tained a compulsory flag salute by denying a free exercise exemption in
Minnersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). However, Gobitis was
overruled in Barnette, thus, commencing the strand of case law granting a First
Amendment right not to speak.
24 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626.
Id. at 629.
2 See id. at 641.
27 Id. at 642.
28 Id.
29 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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New Hampshire law criminalizing the act of obscuring the
"Live Free or Die" motto on the state license plate." The
Maynards, both Jehovah's Witnesses, had covered the motto on
their car's license plate because it conflicted with their reli-
gious belief that "life is more precious than freedom."3 The
Maynards challenged the constitutionality of the law as it
effectively forced them to display a slogan that they found
"morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent."32
Relying heavily on Barnette, the Supreme Court found, "[t]he
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are com-
plementary components of the broader concept of 'individual
freedom of mind."'33 Here, like the school board's interest
in promoting nationalism in Barnette, the Court held that
New Hampshire's interest in compelling the display of
the state motto did not overcome the plaintiff's First
Amendment protections. 4
B. Compulsory Fee Cases
While the "right of association" is not itself a right ex-
pressly granted by the First Amendment,35 the phrase has
developed into a guarantee formed by the aggregate meaning
of those rights that are expressly granted.36 Given the right to
associate, the ancillary right not to associate has likewise
evolved." The bulk of challenges claiming a right not to asso-
ciate has been brought by individuals subject to a compulsory
30 Id. at 709.
31 Id. at 708 n.2.
22 Id. at 713.
23 Id. at 714.
" See Wooly, 430 U.S. at 717. The State claimed that the compulsory display
of the motto was justified by its interest in (1) facilitating the identification of
vehicles and (2) promoting the appreciation of history, individualism and state
pride. See id. at 716. The Court found that these interests were legitimate, but
that the State had not chosen a constitutional means of promoting them. See id.
at 717.
25 See supra note 21.
26 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that it was unconstitu-
tional for Alabama to compel the NAACP to furnish a membership list).
"7 See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Keller v. State Bar
of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Chicago Teacher's Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292
(1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Han-
dlers, Express and Station Employes, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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fee. Compulsory fee cases often arise in the labor context,
when non-union employees challenge the expenditure of fees
from an "agency shop" provision," or in the context of the in-
tegrated bar, when lawyers challenge the use of bar dues." In
all of the compulsory fee cases, the Supreme Court recognizes
the impact such fees may have on the First Amendment rights
of non-union employees or integrated bar members, yet, in its
analysis, the Court rarely takes into consideration the speech
and association rights separately or specifically.4" As a result,
the body of compulsory fee cases creates an indistinct hybrid-
ization of the negative speech and association rights of the
First Amendment.
An agency shop provision requires that, as a condition of
employment, all non-union employees in a bargaining unit pay
the union a service fee for the benefits of representation.4 In
Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson,42 the United States
Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the Nebraska Supreme
Court upholding an injunction of a union shop provision on
First Amendment grounds of freedom of association.43 The
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Chicago Teacher's Un-
ion v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and
Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes, 466 U.S. 435
(1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
" Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S.
820 (1961).
41 See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
41 This Comment uses the terms "agency shop" and "union shop" inter-
changeably, so a brief explanation of their differences is necessary for accuracy.
Under a union shop provision, an employee must become a member of the bar-
gaining unit's union within a certain time after being hired. In contrast, an agency
shop provision requires that an employee who chooses not to join the union pay a
service fee to the union, usually equal in amount to union dues. Under federal
case law, the courts have viewed the union shop agreement as the "practical
equivalent" to an agency shop provision. For an explanation, see Martin H. Malin,
The Legal Status of Union Security Fee Arbitration after Chicago Teachers Union
v. Hudson, 29 B.C. L. REV. 857, 857 n.2 (1988); see also NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744 (1963) ('Such a difference between the union and agency
shop may be of great importance in some contexts, but for present purposes it is
more formal than real."); Abood, 431 U.S. at 217 n.10. However, a significant
difference between the two provisions seems worthy of mention. Unlike an employ-
ee forced to join the union under a union shop provision, a non-union employee
under an agency provision only pays a fee to the union and, thus, has no voice in
the union's internal democratic process.
42 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
"' See id. at 230.
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Supreme Court agreed that there were "justiciable questions
under the First Amendment"" but, nevertheless, reversed the
lower court and held that the union shop provision was pro-
tected by the Railway Labor Act.45 The Court recognized that
a union shop agreement may infringe on a non-union
employee's First Amendment rights; however, since Congress
had protected such agreements under the Railway Labor Act,
the Court declined to second guess Congress' contentious policy
decisions.46 The Court opined that, in protecting union shop
provisions, Congress had the legitimate objective of peacefully
settling labor disputes.
In Hanson, the non-union employees did not challenge the
union's expenditure of fees generated by the union shop provi-
sion, but challenged the enforcement and application of the
provision itself.48  The Court noted, however, that "[ilf
'assessments' are in fact imposed for purposes not germane to
collective bargaining, a different problem would be present-
ed."49 Thus, subsequently, in International Association of Ma-
chinists v. Street,5" the Supreme Court heard a constitutional
challenge to the expenditure of non-union fees generated by a
union shop provision.5 In Street, the non-union employees
challenged the union's expenditure of their fees to fund politi-
cal campaigns for candidates whom they did not support.52
" Id. at 231.
" See id. at 233. The Railway Labor Act, enacted by labor and management
consensus in 1926, aimed to avoid the disruptions in commerce caused by railway
labor disputes. See Harry A. Rissetto, Overview of the Railway Labor Act, SA31
ALI-ABA 1, 3, 9 (1996). At issue in Hanson was section 2, Eleventh, an amend-
ment of 1951 that annulled the Act's prohibition of union shop agreements. See
Hanson, 351 U.S. at 230. Section 2, Eleventh, specifically provided for union shop
agreements. See id. at 229.
6 See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 233. Justice Douglas wrote, "Congress, acting with-
in its constitutional powers, has the final say on policy issues." Id. at 234. Two
policies frequently advanced to justify agency shop provisions are the avoidance of
a "free-rider" problem and the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. The "free-
rider" issue addresses the benefits non-union employees get from union representa-
tion. Agency provisions seek to make sure that the union is compensated for its
services, as it must consider the interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.
See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1991).
,T See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 233.
See id. at 227.
" Id. at 235.
60 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
5' See id. at 744.
62 See id.
1999]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Since Street presented constitutional expenditure issues not
presented in Hanson, the Court reexamined the propriety of
the Railway Labor Act.53 The majority maintained the
Hanson rule that the Railway Labor Act constitutionally pro-
tected union shop provisions, but added that a union's use of
fees for political or other causes not germane to collective bar-
gaining is not within the Act's protections.54 In Street, as in
Hanson, the Court did not rule on the constitutionality of un-
ion shop agreements or certain expenditures thereunder. In-
stead, the Court addressed only whether the relevant portion
of the Railway Labor Act was constitutional in its protection of
agency shop provisions.5
The Hanson and Street trend of eluding the central First
Amendment issues of compelled funding continued in the sub-
sequent cases of Lathrop v. Donahue56 and Brotherhood of
Railway Clerks v. Allen.57 In Lathrop, a lawyer challenged the
constitutionality of both the compulsory dues imposed by the
Wisconsin Bar and the Bar's expenditure of such dues to fund
political causes which he opposed.5" The Court was bound by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's factual determination that
the bar dues were not used to influence political and ideologi-
cal agendas and, thus, only considered the plaintiffs challenge
to the imposition of the fee itself.59 Relying heavily on
Hanson, the Supreme Court found the Bar had a legitimate
end in its policy of "elevating the educational and ethical stan-
dards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of legal
' See id. at 747-49.
14 See id. at 768. An activity is considered to be germane to collective bargain-
ing when it speaks to the benefits non-union employees receive from the exclusivi-
ty of union representation. See Street, 367 U.S. at 761; see also supra note 46.
Moreover, while the Court found a violation of the Railway Labor Act in Street, it
did not enjoin the union from funding political causes with objecting employees'
fees. See Street, 367 U.S. at 775. Instead, the United States Supreme Court re-
manded to the Georgia Supreme Court for further actions in accordance with the
holding of Hanson. See id.
" See Street, 367 U.S. at 749-50.
56 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
57 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
" See Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 827. The lawyer's "kitchen sink" challenge was
based on his rights of "freedom of association, assembly, speech, press, conscience
and thought," as well as the due process and equal protection clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. at 828 n.4.
" See id. at 828. ,
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services."6 The Court found no occasion to consider the First
Amendment issues raised by the attorney and quoted the dicta
of Hanson, "'[o]n the present record, there is no more an in-
fringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than
there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is
required to be a member of an integrated bar."'' 1 Thus, the
state's actions were only subject to Supreme Court review
concerning the due process clause, of which the Court did not
find a violation, and the question of undue burden.
2 The
Court found that the public interest promoted outweighed the
"slight inconvenience" to the objecting lawyer.63
Similarly, in Allen, non-union railway employees bound by
an agency shop provision challenged the union's expenditure of
fees to fund political activities with which they disagreed and
successfully attained an injunction of the expenditures from
the North Carolina Superior Court." On appeal, again, the
United States Supreme Court did not rule on the First Amend-
ment issues presented by compulsory funding. The Court did,
however, reverse the lower court's injunction because it was
inconsistent with Street's requirements that non-union employ-
ees make their dissent affirmatively known and that there be a
showing of which union expenditures were political in order to
effectuate a refund or future remedy.
65
The Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment chal-
lenge to an agency shop provision for the first time, in 1977, in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.66 The provision required
all non-union teachers to pay a service fee to the union in the
same amount as union dues.67 The Supreme Court began its
analysis by reviewing Hanson and Street, and determined that
those cases were controlling.6 Although federal labor law was
inapplicable to the state employees in Abood, several of the
state's labor provisions mirrored those of the Railway Labor
6 Id. at 843.
6 Id. at 843 (quoting Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238
(1956)).
62 See Lanthrop, 367 U.S. at 844.
63 Id.
64 See Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 117 (1963).
65 See id. at 119, 121.
66 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
See id. at 212.
6' See id. at 222.
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Act.69 Accordingly, the Court held constitutional the funding
of union activities that were germane to the purpose of promot-
ing collective bargaining.7" More significantly, however, the
Court further held that the funding of political and ideological
activities with which non-union teachers disagreed was a viola-
tion of the First Amendment because the activities were unre-
lated to the purpose of collective bargaining.7' In Abood, the
non-union teachers' corollary freedom not to associate was
recognized because, although the non-union teachers were
forced into, not prohibited from, funding political causes, there
was still an infringement on their constitutional rights.72 Af-
ter citing the famous "fixed star" quote of Barnette,7' the
Court explained that "the freedom of belief is no incidental or
secondary aspect of the First Amendment's protections."74
Following Abood, later Supreme Court opinions began to
clarify which specific union expenditures of compulsory fees
were constitutional and how unconstitutional expenditures
could be returned. For example, in Ellis v. Brotherhood of
Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks,75 the Court explained
that union conventions, publications, and litigation incidental
to collective bargaining negotiations were constitutional expen-
ditures of non-union members' dues.76 However, the funding
of union organizing and social activities was not germane to
the purpose of the compulsory fee, and thus presented a viola-
tion of the non-employees' freedom not to associate.7 7 Further-
more, the Ellis Court held that an agency shop agreement
could not require an objecting non-union employee to pay a full
service fee, then later rebate the portion representing politi-
cal expenditures with which the non-union employee did not
69 See id. at 223.
70 See id. at 232.
71 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 234.
72 See id. at 234.
" See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
74 Abood, 431 U.S. at 235.
7' 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
716 See id. at 448-53.
7 See id. at 449.
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agree." The Court stated that there were other reasonable al-
ternatives to a rebate system and held that even the tempo-
rary commitment of an objecting employee's fee was a violation
of the right not to associate.79
In Chicago Teacher's Union v. Hudson,"° the Court fur-
ther shaped the remedy stages of compulsory dues cases when
it held that the constitutional collection of an agency fee mini-
mally required "an adequate explanation of the basis for the
fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount
of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for
the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are
pending."8 In Hudson, the Court not only required that the
government have a strong enough interest to support an agen-
cy shop, it further required a procedure utilizing those burdens
in a way that is "carefully tailored to minimize" the First
Amendment infringement of the objecting employees' rights. 2
Subsequently, compulsory fee cases have relied on this require-
ment to justify an application of a strict scrutiny standard
when the First Amendment is implicated.'
In consonance with Abood and its progeny, twenty-one
attorneys commenced another challenge to the expenditure of
integrated bar dues in Keller v. State Bar of California.' Un-
like the result in Lathrop nearly thirty years earlier, in Keller,
a unanimous Supreme Court held that the Bar's expenditure of
dues not germane to its purpose of "regulating the legal profes-
sion" and "'improving the quality of ... legal service[s]'" violat-
ed the objecting lawyers' First Amendment right not to associ-
ate.' The Court cautioned that "those activities having politi-
cal or ideological coloration" are not always easy to discern, but
found that the challenged funding of gun control and weapons
freeze initiatives was clearly of the political and ideological ilk
that violated objectors' constitutional rights. 8
"s See id.
79 See id. at 444.
" 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
'* Id. at 310.
,2 Id. at 303.
8' See, e.g., Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 506 (Cal.
1993).
' 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
, Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
,' Id. at 15, 16.
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Lastly, in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 7 the Supreme
Court synthesized nearly fifty years of cases to create a more
compartmentalized and seemingly sensible three-prong analy-
sis to determine the constitutionality of the expenditure of
objectors' shop fees.88 For an expenditure of agency shop fees
to be valid, Lehnert held that it must: "1) be 'germane' to col-
lective-bargaining activity; 2) be justified by the government's
vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding free riders;
and 3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech
that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union
shop."89 This three-prong Lehnert analysis is the current
means by which the courts determine the constitutionality of
the expenditure of fees generated by agency shop provisions.
The First Amendment review applied in compulsory fee
cases retains a distinctive quality because it evolved from a
statutory analysis of the Railway Labor Act's allowance for
agency shop agreements. The application of an analysis shaped
mostly in the field of labor law to challenges to the appropria-
tion of mandatory student fees presents difficulties due to the
inherent differences between the union shop, or integrated bar,
and the university.
C. Challenges to Mandatory Student Fees
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
constitutionality of compelled funding in the area of mandatory
student activity fees at public universities.' While Abood
500 U.S. 507 (1991).
88 See id. at 519.
89 Id.
In Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that funding of a
religious student newspaper must be considered on a viewpoint neutral basis once
a fee-funded forum has been created) (a case on which the ADF was also of coun-
sel), the Court, citing to Abood and Keller, specifically did not address "the ques-
tion whether an objecting student has the First Amendment right to demand a
pro rata return to the extent the fee is expended for speech to which he or she
does not subscribe." Id. at 840. In concurrence, however, Justice O'Connor did
recognize "the possibility that the student fee is susceptible to a Free Speech
Clause challenge by an objecting student that she should not be compelled to pay
for speech with which she disagrees." Id. at 851 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus,
while not at issue in Rosenberger, Justice O'Connor did foreshadow Southworth by
mentioning the possibility of a First Amendment challenge to certain expenditures
of mandatory student fees.
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technically occurred in an educational setting, the expenditures
at issue were teachers' agency shop fees and, thus, ultimately
spoke not to academic issues but rather to labor and employ-
ment issues. Conversely, in the student fee cases that follow,
students have challenged the expenditure of their mandatory
activity fee, which does speak to the definitions and concepts
of education.
While the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether
the use of mandatory student fees to fund political and ideolog-
ical student groups violates objecting students' First Amend-
ment rights against compelled speech and association, some
circuit and state courts have considered the issue. Perhaps
because of case-by-case factual differences as to the challenged
group activity, or the varying broadness of the interests offered
by the defendant universities, the courts have not decided such
issues uniformly.
In 1983, in Kania v. Fordham,9" the Fourth Circuit heard
a University of North Carolina student's challenge to the
school's use of a portion of his mandatory activity fee to fund a
newspaper that expressed viewpoints with which he dis-
agreed.92 The Fourth Circuit distinguished the student's con-
stitutional challenge from Abood by recognizing that the edu-
cational setting is inherently different from that of labor rela-
tions in a union shop.93 Applying a modified Abood "germane-
ness" analysis, the court found that a university newspaper is
"a vital part of the University's educational mission, and that
financing it is germane to the University's duties as an educa-
tional institution."94 The court further distinguished the labor
context from the funding of the school newspaper because the
nature of the "union viewpoint" was one-sided; whereas,
the paper opened a forum for "'uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open' expression.""
The Fifth Circuit rejected an analogous newspaper funding
challenge by students of Southwest Texas State University in
Hays v. Supple.96 Using the Supreme Court's three prong
9 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983).
See id. at 477.
3 See id. at 479.
94 Id. at 480.
" Id. (citation omitted).
96 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992).
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Lehnert analysis,97 the Fifth Circuit held that the University-
sponsored newspaper narrowly advanced important govern-
ment interests because it created a forum for discussion and
allowed students to attain journalism experience." In adopt-
ing the Lehnert analysis, the Fifth Circuit did not specifically
distinguish the labor and university contexts as the Fourth
Circuit had done in Kania. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit did
focus on the newspaper as the creation of a "forum for public
discussion," not the one-sided promotion of a particular view-
point associated with a political student organization.99
In Galda v. Rutgers,' two years after the first newspa-
per challenge in Kania, students contested the constitutionality
of Rutgers' funding of a politically active campus organization.
The Third Circuit heard the students' challenge to the
university's policy of compelling them to fund NJPIRG °'
with a portion of a mandatory, refundable fee. The circuit court
held that the mandatory, refundable fee imposed on objecting
students violated their First Amendment rights.0 2 Instead of
permitting the University to collect the funds-even though
these funds were refundable to the students-the court suggest-
ed that the university adopt a system of voluntary student con-
tributions to NJPIRG.1'0 In weighing the university's inter-
ests against the objecting students' interests, the court found
See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
98 Hays, 969 F.2d at 123.
99 Id. at 123-24. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Hays from Galda because a
newspaper, unlike a political organization, does not espouse a particular viewpoint,
but instead provides a forum for the expression of a wider array of ideas. See id.
at 124.
1- 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985).
... The New Jersey Public Interest Research Group ('NJPIRG") is a non-parti-
san, independent, non-profit corporation that "actively engages in research, lobby-
ing and advocacy for social change." Id. at 1061. In Galda, although NJPIRG was
initially ineligible for student activity fees funding because of its independent na-
ture, it was later funded as a result of a student referendum. See id. at 1061-62.
The referendum required over 25% of the student body and a majority of the
votes cast to approve funding NJPIRG. See id.
" See id. at 1067.
'" See Galda, 772 F.2d at 1068 n.5.
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that the educational benefits of NJPIRG were only inciden-
tal to its political motives and, further, that such educa-
tional benefits could be achieved through a less drastic,
alternative means.'
The Second Circuit case of Carroll v. Blinken °5 presents
a challenge similar to that presented in Galda by the Rutgers
students. In Carroll, several SUNY Albany students claimed
that the compulsory funding of NYPIRG'0 5 violated their
right against compelled association.0 7 Relying on the speech
interests protected in Barnette, and the analysis of Abood and
its progeny, the Second Circuit reduced the tension of interests
by limiting the university's funding of NYPIRG to on-campus
activities.' The court found that the interests the state of-
fered.0 9 to defend funding NYPIRG with student fees were
"substantial enough to justify the infringement" on the
students' "right against compelled speech.""0 By limiting the
activities that the university could fund based on their loca-
tion, not their content, the court was able to diminish the in-
fringement on the objecting students' rights."'
Moreover, adding to the disjunction between the circuits,
in Rounds v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education"2-a
case decided after Southworth-the Ninth Circuit, unlike the
Seventh Circuit, rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of
the University of Oregon's funding of OSPIRG EF"3 with
10 See id. at 1065-66.
10 957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992).
106 New York Public Interest Research Group ("NYPIRG"), like its New Jersey
counterpart in Galda, is a "non-partisan research and advocacy organization." Id.
at 994. In a referendum held every two years, the students at SUNY Albany de-
cide whether to fund NYPIRG through their activity fee, and the students have
always approved the funding. See id.
107 See id. at 995-96.
10 See id. at 1001.
109 SUNY Albany offered three interests to support the expenditure of activity
fees to fund NYPIRG: "1) the general promotion of extracurricular activities, 2) the
facilitation of what the district court called 'participatory civics training', and 3)
the stimulation of robust campus debate on a variety of public issues." Carroll,
957 F.2d at 999.
1 Id. at 1001.
m See id.
112 166 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1999).
11 Oregon Student Public Interest Research Group Education Fund ("OSPIRG
EF"), a non-partisan group like the PIRGs challenged in Galda and Carroll, aimed
to "develop students' potential to become educated and responsible citizens who are
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mandatory student activity fees. In this challenge, nearly iden-
tical to those in Galda and Carroll, the Ninth Circuit held that
the allocation of mandatory student activities fees to OSPIRG
EF did not violate the objecting students' First Amendment
right to be free from compelled association.11 6 First, the court
applied the germaneness doctrine of Abood."5 Finding that
OSPIRG EF's programs met the educational objectives of the
University and recognizing that the goals of a university are
much broader than a labor union or state bar, the court held
that the compelled funding of OSPIRG EF's activities was
germane to the purpose of education."'
Next, applying what it dubbed an "intermediate level of
scrutiny," borrowed from Lehnert, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the funding of OSPIRG EF with mandatory stu-
dent activity fees was "adequately supported by a governmen-
tal interest."17 Noting that the inquiry is a "fact-sensitive"
one, the Ninth Circuit found that the objecting students were
not compelled to become members of OSPIRG EF, nor were
they compelled to speak any message with which they dis-
agreed." 8  Moreover, the court analogized Rounds to
Kania,"' a newspaper case, determining that OSPIRG EF
was not, and was not perceived to be, speaking for all the stu-
dents in attendance at the University of Oregon. 2 ' Accord-
ingly, the Ninth Circuit, unlike the Seventh Circuit in
Southworth, allowed the University of Oregon to fund OSPIRG
EF with mandatory student fees because the organization was
part of a "limited public forum--one that embraces a wide
array of groups representing diverse interests. 21
informed about the American legislative process and political system." Id. at 1034;
see supra notes 101 and 106.
11 See Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1037.
. See id. ("The germaneness doctrine of Abood does not silence organizational
speech; rather, it requires only that ideological activities not germane to an
organization's purpose be funded through sources other than compulsory fees.").
.16 See id. at 1039.
1 Id. at 1037.
1 Id. at 1037-38.
9 See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
.2 See Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1038 (citing Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 478
n.6 (4th Cir. 1983)).
121 Id. at 1039. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Rounds from Southworth based
on factual grounds and noted, "Itlo the extent that Southworth holds that a public
university may not constitutionally establish and fund a limited public forum for
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Additionally, on the state level, in Smith v. Regents of the
University of California,"' over a strongly worded dissent,
the California Supreme Court extracted principles from the
Carroll, Galda, Keller and Abood line of cases and observed
that the use of mandatory student activity fees are generally
permissible if "germane to the university's educational mis-
sion."1" However, the court cautioned that "at some point"
the educational benefits of the funded group become incidental
to its political objectives and no longer justify the burden on
objecting students' speech and association rights." The Cali-
fornia court held that "the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and association do not permit the state to make speech
a matter of compulsion and coercion," and found that the ob-
jecting students were unduly burdened by the compulsion to
fund the political and ideological groups whose purposes were
only incidentally educational. 2 ' The California Supreme
Court stressed that the decision was not about the abridgment
of the political and ideological organizations' association
and speech rights, but was, in fact, about the objecting
students' guarantee of freedom from compulsion to exercise
those same rights.126
The objecting students in Smith challenged the funding of
a laundry list of 14 student organizations that pursued politi-
cal and ideological goals.'27 This challenge was unlike Galda
and Carroll-and Rounds, which followed Smith-because ob-
jecting students in those cases exclusively challenged the fund-
ing of PIRGs. 2 ' In Smith, the objecting students challenged
the funding of environmental, feminist, gay and lesbian, hu-
man rights and other progressive student organizations.'29
This distinction is significant because the objecting students
who challenged the funding of NYPIRG, NJPIRG or ORSPIRG
were objecting to a singular, self-described partisan student
the expression of diverse viewpoints, we respectfully disagree .... " Id. at 1040
n.5.
'2 844 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1993).
'23 Id. at 511.
124 Id.
12 Id. at 503.
126 See id.
127 See Smith, 844 P.2d at 504-05.
2 See supra notes 101, 106 and 113 and accompanying text.
'2 See Smith, 844 P.2d at 504-05.
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group. Conversely, in Smith-and Southworth as well-the ob-
jecting students cited a vast array of student organizations
that are only related because they can be construed as repre-
senting liberal or progressive politics.
In dissent, Justice Arabian termed the majority's decision
a "jurisprudential debacle" and argued that all on-campus
speech is germane to the educational mission, and, thus, justi-
fied by compelling state interests."' 0 Justice Arabian further
argued that the court should have deferred to the University's
"considered academic judgment" instead of creating the "ill-
conceived dichotomy" between the political and the education-
al."' The dissenting Justice's opinion stressed the "altogether
different" scope of a University campus and a union shop,
remarking that a university's "interests are not narrowly voca-
tional, but broadly educational."' Unlike the majority in
Smith, the dissent recognized the possible devastating effects
of the holding on the positive speech rights of the political and
ideological organizations.' Appreciating the gravity and fra-
gility of free speech on a university campus, Justice Arabian
warned, "[wie must approach our task, therefore, 'with special
caution,' understanding that the institution's continued vitality
and independance [sic] are contingent upon its freedom from
disruptive judicial interference.""
II. SOUTHWORTH V. GREBE
A. Facts
In 1996, Scott Southworth, Amy Schoepke and Keith
Bannach, three law students'35 enrolled in the University of
Wisconsin-Madison ('JWM"), commenced an action in the Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Wisconsin challenging
'30 Id. at 518.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 519.
'3 See id. at 521.
134 Smith, 844 P.2d at 521 (citation omitted).
1" At the time the action was commenced, Southworth and Bannach were in
their third year of law school and Schoepke was in her second year. See
Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *1, *2
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996).
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aspects of the Board of Regents' mandatory stident activity fee
policy.'36 The three students sought injunctive and declarato-
ry relief, alleging that the mandatory fee policy violated their
rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, free exer-
cise of religion, and their rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, because a portion of the funds generated by
the fee were allocated to organizations that engaged in political
and ideological activities to which the students objected.'37
At UWM, student activity fees are allocated to a wide
variety of student organizations.13  The plaintiffs in
Southworth challenged only the funding of politically and ideo-
logically active organizations to which they objected.'39 The
students specifically cited and objected to eighteen different
progressive campus organizations that received funding from
mandatory student fees and engaged in political and ideologi-
cal activities, speech and advocacy. 40 The eighteen politically
and ideologically active organizations offered as evidence by
the objecting students were: WISPIRG; the Lesbian, Gay, Bi-
sexual Campus Center; the Campus Women's Center; the UW
Greens; the Madison AIDS Support Network; the International
Socialist Organization; The Ten Percent Society; the Progres-
sive Student Network; Amnesty International; United States
Student Association; Community Action Latin America; La
Colectiva Cultural de Aztlan; The Militant Student Union of
the University of Wisconsin; the Student Labor Action Coali-
tion; Student Solidarity; Students of National Organization of
Women; MADPAC; and *Madison Treaty Rights Support
" See id. at *1-*2. The activity fee policy of the Regents is mandatory because
students cannot graduate or receive their grade reports if they have not paid the
semester's fee. See id. at *2-*3.
137 See id. at *1. The district court held that there was a violation of the ob-
jecting students' rights to free speech and association and, thus, did not find the
need to further address the other alleged violations. See id. at *36. The Supreme
Court declared the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Therefore, on appeal, the circuit court only
heard arguments on the objecting students' free speech and association claims. See
Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1998). After its analysis of the
free speech claim, the court did not find it necessary to consider what the alleged
violation of the association clause 'would add to the students' claim." Id. at 733
n.15. This Comment, thus, focuses on the objecting students' free speech claim.
" See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720.
139 See id.
140 See id.
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Group.'4 These eighteen challenged groups were involved in
lobbying, demonstrating, rallying, marching, distributing news-
letters and hosting web-pages that promoted political caus-
es. The objecting students claimed to have deeply held reli-
gious beliefs that conflicted with the views of the organizations
cited and argued that their First Amendment rights were vio-
lated because the Regents' fee policy compelled them to fund
these organizations.'
Under section 36.09 of the Wisconsin Code, the Board of
Regents has ultimate control over the allocation of the funds
generated by student activity fees.'" The sum of the funds
generated by the activity fees is classified by the Regents as
either allocable or non-allocable.'45 The Regents automatical-
ly budget the non-allocable funds for operating costs of campus
programs such as recreational sports and health services. 4 '
In contrast, the allocable funds are distributed by grants from
the student representative body, the Associated Students of
Madison ("ASM"). 47 These allocable funds are budgeted to a
wide array of student organizations, including those political
and ideological groups cited by the objecting students.'
Thus, the allocable portion of the funds generated by
the student activity fees is the only expenditure at issue
in Southworth.'
These allocable fees are the source of funding for the ASM
budget and General Student Services Fund ("GSSF"). 5 ° In
141 See id.
142 See id. at 720-21 (the court specifically describes the political activities of
WISPIRG, UW Greens, Progressive Student Network, International Socialist Orga-
nization, Campus Women's Center, the Ten Percent Society and Amnesty Interna-
tional).
See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 718.
14 Section 36.09(5) provides in part:
[S]tudents shall have primary responsibility for the formulation and re-
view of policies concerning life, services, and interests. Students in con-
sultation with the chancellor and subject to the final confirmation of the
board shall have the responsibility for the disposition of those student
fees which constitute substantial support for campus student activities.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.09(5) (West 1998).
14 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 719.
14. See id.
147 See id.
14 See id.; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text.
1 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 719.
... See id.
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turn, the ASM budget and GSSF are distributed to other stu-
dent organizations.'51 Both the ASM and GSSF have different
allocation procedures.152
The ASM budget funds student groups, but they must be
registered student organizations to qualify.'53 These opera-
tion grants are not available to recipient organizations of the
GSSF.'54 The registered student organization "must be a for-
malized not-for-profit group, composed mainly, but not neces-
sarily exclusively, of students, and controlled and directed by
students." 5 After reviewing an application, the ASM may
grant the organization funding for operational costs from the
ASM budget. 55
The GSSF is also allocated to student organizations by a
student committee.'5 ' Registered student organizations, uni-
versity departments and community-based service organiza-
tions are eligible for funding from the GSSF. 55 The commit-
tee reviews an organization's application and then determines
whether to grant or deny the organization's request for fund-
ing."'59 If the committee approves a grant to the appli-
cant organization, it then decides the amount budgeted to
the organization. 60
In addition to submitting an application to the ASM, or
the committee that distributes grants from the GSSF, a regis-
tered student organization may seek funding from these bud-
gets by student referendum.'' WISPIRG, one of the organi-
151 See id.
152 See id.
" See id& at 719-20. In the 1995-1996 academic year the ASM distributed
$109,277 in student fees to campus organizations. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at
719.
,' See Associated Students of Madison Bylaws, Art. 7, § 4(d)(3) (1998) (on file
with the Brooklyn Law Review).
'" Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720.
156 See id. at 719. Such operational costs may include related travel expenses or
funding to sponsor an event. See id. at 720.
15? See id. at 720. The committee is known on the UWM campus as the Stu-
dent Services Finance Committee ("SSFC"). The committee consists of students
elected to the ASM. See id. at 719. During the 1995-1996 academic year the SSFC
distributed roughly $109,277 in student fees to campus organizations. See
Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720.
15, See id. at 720.
... See id.
" See id.
161 See id.
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zations to which the objecting students cite, secured funding by
a student referendum in the 1995-1996 academic year.162
After the three aforementioned methods of student fee
allocation are complete, budgetary decisions are sent to the
Chancellor of the Regents for review and final approval.16
The ASM has total authority over the allocation of most stu-
dent fees, but the Board of Regents has the final authority to
approve or disapprove the budgetary decisions."
B. The District Court Decision
In a memorandum and order, Judge Shabaz of the West-
ern District of Wisconsin recognized that the "corollary" speech
and association rights of the First Amendment were at is-
sue.'6 5 Since the objecting students' First Amendment rights
were implicated by the Regents' expenditure of their mandato-
ry fees, Judge Shabaz applied the Hudson strict scrutiny stan-
dard. 166 The Hudson strict scrutiny standard requires that
the Regents offer a compelling state interest to justify the First
Amendment infringement resulting from the fee
expenditures.1 67 The Hudson analysis further obligates the
Regents to achieve the compelling state interest through the
means least restrictive of the students' rights. 61
At issue, the Judge explained, was the tension between
UWM's interest in the expression of an array of diverse view-
points and the objecting students' constitutional guarantee
against the compelled funding of political and ideological activ-
ities.'69 Judge Shabaz considered this tension of interests
1" See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720. WISPIRG secured $49,500 in student fees
that year. See id. WISPIRG, Wisconsin Public Interest Research Group, is anal-
ogous to NJPIRG and NYPIRG, the organizations challenged in Galda and Carroll.
See supra notes 101 and 106.
1 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720.
See id.; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 36.09(5) (West 1998); supra note 144.
1 Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *12
(citing West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
16 See id.
1 See id.; see also supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
1'8 See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *12.
16 See id. at *13.
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analogous to those competing concerns of the lawyers and
the bar in Keller17° and of the teachers and the union
in Abood. 7'
Quoting the California Supreme Court in Smith,'72 the
district court adopted the Abood and Keller "teaching" that the
Regents may allocate mandatory fees to political and ideologi-
cal organizations for a compelling reason if the allocation of
funds is germane to the purposes that justify the imposition of
the fee.'7 ' The Regents argued that the Abood and Keller doc-
trine was inapplicable because, unlike a union or bar associa-
tion, the organizations to which the objecting students dis-
agreed "d[id] not purport to speak for all students."'74 Judge
Shabaz quickly rejected this argument because the rights to
freedom of speech and association are guaranteed "regardless
of whether or not the infringement of said rights is perceived
by others."7 ' The Judge found that the Regents' defense was
irrelevant to the determination of whether the objecting
students' First Amendment rights had been violated because
peoples' perceptions of the support garnered by certain organi-
zations would not eradicate an occurring violation.'76 The
Regents also argued that the objecting students, unlike a union
or bar association, could work within the democratic process in
place through UWM's representative student body.'77 The
Judge likewise rejected this defense because the distinction of
an available democratic process was not considered by the
Supreme Court in Keller.'78
In support of funding student organizations through the
mandatory fee program, the Regents argued that the UWM
was not compelling the objecting students to speak and associ-
ate, but rather, the UWM was creating a public forum for the
interaction of disparate viewpoints.'79 Judge Shabaz rejected
170 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
1 See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *14-*15; see also supra
notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 122-132 and accompanying text.
17 Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980 at *16.
17 Id. at *16-*17.
175 Id. at *16.
174 See id. at *16-*17.
177 See id. at *18-*19.
178 See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *18-*19.
171 See id. at *31.
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the Regents' public forum argument because the activities of
the cited organizations appeared more like political and ideo-
logical advocacy than the exchange of ideas.18 Further, it did
not appear that most of the activities occurred on the UWM
campus.181 The Judge distinguished the political and ideo-
logical organizations at issue in Southworth from the school
newspapers at issue in Kania'82 and Hays' because a
newspaper "clearly" provides a forum for students to express a
spectrum of ideas, while the political and ideological organiza-
tions did not always open such a forum."M
In another argument to save the allocation of mandatory
fees to the political and ideological student groups, the Regents
argued that the fees were not actually used to fund political
and ideological activities."8 ' The Regents argued that the ob-
jecting students had no proof that their fees were actually and
directly funding the political and ideological groups with which
they disagreed.' The court summarily dismissed this argu-
ment as a matter of "bookkeeping."18 7
The court did not determine the purpose of each of the
eighteen cited organizations, but made a general determination
that the organizations were primarily political. 88 Adopting
the balancing analysis created by the California Supreme
Court in Smith, the district court determined that the educa-
tional value of the funded organizations was only incidental to
political motives.'89 Thus, the court held that the funding of
such organizations was no longer germane to the university's
educational purpose.' Since the funding of these organiza-
tions was not germane to the Regents' interest in education
and a more narrowly tailored program could have been imple-
mented, the court held that the Regents had infringed on the
objecting students' First Amendment speech and association
180 See id. at *33.
181 See id.
182 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
1 Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *32.
18 See id. at *33.
18 See id.
18 Id. at *34.
188 See id. at *26.
18 See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *22-*23.
190 See id. at *26.
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rights.' 9' The court suggested "some sort of opt-out provision
or refund system" for objecting students, but it did not fashion
an appropriate remedy as the parties had agreed to do this on
their own."'
C. The Seventh Circuit Opinion
Unlike the district court, the Seventh Circuit employed the
Supreme Court's three-prong Lehnert inquiry' 9 to determine
whether the Regents' expenditure of the mandatory fees violat-
ed the objecting students' free speech rights.'94 The Lehnert
analysis evolved from Abood and Keller as a practical method
for determining the "germaneness" of union expenditures un-
der agency shop provisions.'95 Applying this three prong anal-
ysis to the expenditure of mandatory student fees, the Seventh
Circuit discussed (1) whether the expenditure of the mandato-
ry fees was germane to the interests of the Regents;'96 (2)
whether the Regents offered vital policy interests to justi-
fy compelled speech and association; 97 and (3) whether
the funding of the political and ideological groups added
to the burden on speech rights inherent in a compulsory
fee program.'98
191 See id. at *30.
1 Id. Since the parties had agreed to fashion a remedy on their own, the court
simply ordered that the Regents initiate a system of mandatory fee distribution
tailored narrowly enough to comport with the guarantees of the First Amendment.
See id. However, when the Regents first appealed the district court decision, the
Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as impermissibly interlocutory because the
district court had not yet addressed the objecting students' prayer for injunctive
relief. See Southworth v. Grebe, 124 F.3d 205 (7th Cir. 1997). On remand, the dis-
trict court fashioned a detailed injunctive remedy that required the Regents to
cease the appropriation of mandatory fees to political and ideological groups. See
Southworth v. Grebe, 96-C-09292-S (W.D. Wis. July 24, 1997) (unpublished mem.
and order). The district court ordered that the Regents notify all students of the
political and ideological groups to be funded and the amount of each student's fee
that went to each group. See id. The injunctive order further required that the
Regents submit to arbitration proceedings for disputes over the amount of each
student's fee allocated to support each group or the nature of the groups listed.
See id.
192 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
1 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 724.
195 Id.
194 See id.
1 See id. at 727.
199 See id. at 729.
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In the first prong of the analysis, the court began its "ger-
maneness" inquiry with two questions: "whether there is some
otherwise legitimate government interest justifying any com-
pelled funding; and then whether the specifically challenged
expenditure is germane to that interest."'99 Summarily, the
court noted that it did not need to address the first question
because the objecting students had not claimed that the Re-
gents were without a legitimate interest in maintaining the
mandatory fee program.2 0 The court, thus, only had to decide
the second issue, whether the Regents' expenditure of manda-
tory fees to political and ideological groups was "germane" to
its educational mission.20'
The Regents argued that the expenditure of fees to politi-
cal and ideological groups was germane to its interest in edu-
cation because the support of such groups allowed for "diverse
expression," which was in turn educational. 2  The court re-
jected this argument because the Regents' interpretation of
germaneness was too broad°.20  Looking to Keller, where the
Supreme Court recognized that the Bar's mission was rather
broad, the Seventh Circuit rejected a reading of education
broad enough to encompass the compulsion of speech and asso-
ciationY.2 4 The court decided that the funding of political and
ideological organizations was not "germane" to education be-
cause most student organizations did not receive funding from
activity fees and because the groups that did receive funding
were open to students and non-students alike.
The Board of Regents argued that its interest in education
was inherently broader than those interests offered by the
defendants in Abood and Keller.2 6 As a result, more activities
were germane in this context, including activities of political
10 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 724.
200 See id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See id. at 727.
204 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725; see also supra notes 84-86 and accompa-
nying text. The California State Bar's interest and aim was to "'aid in all matters
pertaining to the advancement of the science of jurisprudence or to the improve-
ment of the administration of justice.'" Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15
(1990).
200 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725.
204 See id.
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and ideological groups."7 The breadth of the educational mis-
sion, the Regents asserted, could not be compared to- the inter-
ests offered by the defendants in Abood and Keller-collective
bargaining and the oversight of the bar-because a union or bar
association has a narrower focus than a university and there-
fore encompasses fewer germane activities." 8 The court rec-
ognized the inherent breadth of an educational mission, but re-
jected the Regents' argument that this breadth made
more activities germane. 9 The court opined that "every-
thing is in a sense educational," which would place no
limit on "germaneness."21"
In addition, the Regents cited Carroll, in which the Second
Circuit acknowledged that the funding of NYPIRG could be
germane to education.21" ' In Carroll, the Second Circuit bal-
anced the university's interest in education against the object-
ing students' rights against compulsion and ordered that
NYPIRG use the amount of its budget equivalent to its funding
grant for activities only on campus."2 The Seventh Circuit in
Southworth did not adopt the Carroll court's compromise."'
Instead, the court found Galda and Smith more persua-
sive."4 In siding with Galda215 and Smith,"6 the court de-
cided that the ideological and political groups were only inci-
dentally educational, which could not justify the burden on the
objecting students' First Amendment rights."7 Furthermore,
in a footnote, in accord with the court below, the Seventh Cir-
cuit hastily distinguished Kania"' and Hays"9 as newspa-
207 See id.
206 See id.
209 See id.
210 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725.
211 See id. at 725-26.
212 See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text; see also Carroll v. Blinken,
957 F.2d 991, 1002 (2d Cir. 1992).
21 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 726-27.
214 See id.
211 See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 122-132 and accompanying text.
217 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 726. The burden on the objecting students is
the third prong of the court's analysis; however, the court discusses this burden in
relation to germaneness in the first prong.
211 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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per cases.2  The court did not discuss why Kania and Hays
upheld the constitutionality of the expenditure of mandatory
student fees simply because the objecting students in
Southworth had not challenged the funding of a newspa-
per."' Despite its conclusion that the allocation of fees to po-
litical and ideological groups was not germane to the Regents'
interest in education, the court continued to the next two
prongs of the Lehnert analysis.222
Under Lehnert, the second prong considers "whether the
compelled fee is justified by vital policy interests of the gov-
ernment."2' In Abood and other agency shop cases, the
government's policy interest was to promote labor peace and
avoid free-riders.224 In Keller, the interest was to regulate
and improve legal services. 5 In Southworth, since the Re-
gents had not mentioned the Lehnert analysis in their brief,
the court focused on the Regents' asserted interest in educa-
tion, which included allowing the students to share in the
governance of the university system. 6
The court found that the Regents' interest in education
was vital, but not so vital as to justify the compulsion of fund-
ing of "private or quasi-private activity."22' As a central com-
ponent of its analysis, the court borrowed from the labor union
cases the notion that there must be a "common cause" to justi-
fy the compulsion of funding.228 To justify fee expenditures in
an agency shop agreement, the "common cause" analysis re-
quires that the non-union and union workers have a shared
interest in the expenditure of the fee.229 Here, the court de-
cided that a "common cause" was absent.230 The court opined
that, while the Regents and the objecting students had a "com-
mon cause" in education, there was no "common cause" be-
220 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727 n.8.
221 See id.
22 See id. at 727.
223 Id.
22 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220-22 (1977).
22 See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15 (1990).
226 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727.
22 Id. The court did not determine whether the students' shared governance of
the university was a vital interest. See id.
228 Id. at 727-28.
22 Id. at 728.
20 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728.
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tween the political and ideological groups and the objecting
students due to their disparate views."'
The Regents further asserted that, as in Abood, there
would be a free-rider problem if objecting students were not
required to fund activities open to them and all UWM stu-
dentsY2 Here, the court rejected the Regents' free-rider argu-
ment by distinguishing a university from a union shop."
The court reasoned that, under the principle of union exclusiv-
ity, the government imposes on the union the duty to fairly
represent the interests of both union and non-union employ-
ees." 4 Conversely, in the university context, a free-rider prob-
lem would not arise because the campus organizations do not
exist in a representative capacity and do not furnish the ob-
jecting students with a "free" benefit.235 To reject the Regents'
argument, the court recognized the inherent contextual differ-
ences that render the free-rider concern absent and inapplica-
ble in Southworth."
Lastly, in the third prong of the analysis, the court ad-
dressed whether the compelled funding significantly added to
the burdening of free speech inherent in a mandatory fee sys-
temY7 This prong acknowledges that there will be an inci-
dental burden on speech when the government compels fund-
ing, but such a burden can be justified by an important govern-
mental interest.238 Although it claimed to have concluded
that the Regents had no "vital governmental interest," the
court assumed arguendo that such an interest existed.239
Thus, the court determined that the Regents' distribution of
compelled fees to political and ideological groups significantly
added to the burden on the objecting students' free speech
rights under the First Amendment.24 °
Quoting Lehnert, the court explained that the intensity of
the objecting students' disagreement with the political and
231 Id.
S ee id.
See id.
'2" See id.
Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728.
26 See id.
"' See id. at 729.
' See id.
239 Id.
2"' See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 729.
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ideological groups was relevant in determining the extent of
the burden on their speech rights.24' Accordingly, since the
objecting students disagreed with the political and ideological
groups based on "deeply held religious beliefs," and since the
groups typically tackled "such emotionally charged issues as
abortion, homosexuality, and the United States' democratic
system," the court held that the fee policy was a particularly
great burden on the students.242 In response, the Regents as-
serted that, without funding to the political and ideological
groups, less speech, and less controversial speech, would result
on campus."4 The court rejected this argument on the
grounds that, while the Constitution does confer a right to free
speech, it does not guarantee funding for speech.2
Within this third prong of the analysis the court quickly
addressed and rejected the Regents' remaining arguments
supporting the appropriation of funds from mandatory student
fees. First, the court addressed the Regents' assertion that the
district court erred in applying a mixed strict scrutiny and ger-
maneness analysis.245 While the Seventh Circuit recognized
that the lower court did "intermingle" these tests, the possible
error was dismissed as harmless since the case was reviewed
de novo on appeal.246
Second, the court rejected the Regents' claim that there
was no evidence that the mandatory fees were being used to
fund groups' actual political and ideological activities.247 Like
the court below, the Seventh Circuit found that this claim was
an irrelevant matter of bookkeeping and noted that a similar
claim was rejected in Abood.248
Third, the Regents argued that the First Amendment was
not violated because the political and ideological groups did not
profess to speak for all students.249 Also in accordance with
the opinion of the court below, the Seventh Circuit rejected
241 See id. at 729; see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 521-
22 (1991) (plurality).
242 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 729.
21 See id.
2" See id. at 729-30.
245 See id. at 731.
246 Id.
247 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732.
248 See id.
211 See id.
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this argument as irrelevant, finding that it did not mat-
ter whether a third party attributed a group's views to an
objecting student."
Fourth, the Regents sought to distinguish Abood and
Keller because the objecting students had the university's dem-
ocratic process available to them."' While the court ac-
knowledged that the non-union teachers in Abood did not have
the union's democratic process, the court noted that this was
not the case in KellerY2 Essentially, the court did not ad-
dress the availability of the democratic process to the objecting
students because Keller had not distinguished bar dues from
agency shop fees on this basis."'
Lastly, the Regents relied on a case upholding the
legislature's appropriation of tax funds to political and ideologi-
cal groups, and a campaign finance reform case, to support the
Regents' similar expenditure of student fees." 4 Relying on
O'Connor's concurrence in Rosenberger, the court distinguished
the tax appropriation cases using the rationale that the stu-
dent fee is not characterized as a tax, but a fund belonging to
the students. 5
In conclusion, the court granted the objecting students'
declaratory relief, holding that the Regents' funding of political
and ideological groups with objecting students' mandatory fees
violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. 6
As a result of its decision on the free speech claim, the court
did not separately or singularly discuss whether the free asso-
ciation claim strengthened the objecting students' constitution-
al argument.5 However, the court did consider the free asso-
ciation clause to the extent it relied on the union shop cases,
o See id.
251 See id.
22 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732.
See id.
25. See id. The Regents relied on Libertarian Party of Indiana u. Packard, 741
F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Indiana's scheme of raising revenue from
personalized license plates, then distributing part of the revenue to political par-
ties, was not a violation of the First Amendment), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976) (holding, in part, that limits on candidates' expenditures on their own
campaigns violated the right to freedom of speech).
2. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732.
2"6 See id. at 732-33.
27 See id. at 733 n.15.
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which hinged on an indistinct hybridization of the free speech
and association clauses.
Having addressed the issues of declaratory relief, the Sev-
enth Circuit discussed the district court's order granting in-
junctive relief.259 The district court had ordered that the Re-
gents "cease the funding of private groups that engage in ideo-
logical or political advocacy."260 Further, the district court
had ordered that the Regents publish written notice setting
forth organizations that engaged in political and ideological
activities, including a determination of each student's pro
rata share of fees to be allocated to such activities. 261' The
Regents were to submit to arbitration proceedings for dis-
putes over amounts of fees paid and the nature of the
organizations involved.262
While, under Ellis,263 the district court had properly re-
jected the Regents' proposal for a refund system,21 the Sev-
enth Circuit found the district court's order to be, as worded,
over-broad. 265 The district court's order was over-broad be-
cause it mandated that the Regents cease the funding of politi-
cal and ideological groups with all student fees, not just the
fees of those students objecting to the groups.66 In actuality,
the objecting students had challenged the funding of political
and ideological activities with their mandatory fees, not the
fees of non-objecting students. 26 Moreover, the district court's
order permitted the Regents to use mandatory fees only for
"activities reasonably intended to promote its educational mis-
sion."26" This mandate was over-broad because the objecting
students only challenged the appropriation of their mandatory
258 See supra Part I.B.
... See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 733.
260 Id.
261 See id.
262 See id.
261 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
2" See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 733.
265 See id.
266 See id.
26 See id. at 733-34.
268 Id.
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fees to political and ideological groups with which they dis-
agreed, they had not challenged the appropriation of their
mandatory fees to fund groups that did not engage in political
or ideological activities." 9
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction to
the extent that it ordered "detailed and specific procedures" for
the Regents to perform."' The detailed measures of the dis-
trict court's injunction implicated notions of federalism because
the Board of Regents is an agency of state government.271
Since the district court had not first given the Regents a
chance to comply with a broader injunction, it could not fash-
ion a mandatory injunction with the specificity reserved for
extreme cases of noncompliance. 2
III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Seventh Circuit's employment of the Lehnert analysis
did not clearly articulate a standard for reviewing the Regents'
interest in relation to the constitutionality of the compelled
funding. In each of the three prongs of the Lehnert analysis,
the court posed a different standard for assessing the interests
offered by the Regents. In the first prong of the analysis, the
"germaneness" prong, the court stated that the interests of-
fered by the Regents to justify the compelled funding had to be
"legitimate."2 73 This legitimacy standard of the first prong is
less stringent than the standard imposed by the second prong
of the analysis, which requires that the compelled funding be
justified by "vital" policy interests. 4 Lastly, in the third
prong of the analysis, the court assessed whether the burden
imposed on the objecting students by the mandatory fee was
justified by an "important" governmental interest. 5 While
each of these prongs referred to the Regents' interest in educa-
tion, it is unclear whether that interest needed to be "legiti-
mate," "vital," or "important," to justify the compelled funding.
29 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 734.
2'0 Id. at 734.
21 See id.
272 See id.
2'3 Id. at 724.
2" Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727.
275 Id. at 729.
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Without a clear standard of review, the notion of education as
a vital interest was obscured, and the objecting students' inter-
ests were doubly counted.
Moreover, while the district court announced the Hudson
strict scrutiny standard requiring that a First Amendment
infringement serve a "compelling state interest," 276 the Sev-
enth Circuit did not articulate any level of scrutiny. In Smith,
the California Supreme Court applied the Hudson strict scru-
tiny test.27 7 However, in dissent, Justice Arabian observed
that neither Abood nor Keller had announced a level of scruti-
ny, and that the Second Circuit in Carroll had applied a "mid-
dle-tier test."278 While the three prong Lehnert inquiry em-
ployed in Southworth drew up three distinct and orderly ave-
nues of analysis, it likewise never clearly articulated the level
of scrutiny applicable to compulsory fee cases.279 Further, in
Rounds, decided subsequent to Southworth, the Ninth Circuit
articulated what it dubbed an "intermediate level of scruti-
ny."280 Quoting the Lehnert Court, the Ninth Circuit required
that the expenditures of mandatory student fees be "adequate-
ly supported by a governmental interest."281 Certainly, even
Rounds fails to qualify the standard the government's interest
must meet, requiring only that the interest be "adequate."282
Therefore, the level of scrutiny applicable to mandatory stu-
dent fee cases remains largely unclear, and the Southworth
decision, by articulating a different level of scrutiny in each
prong of the analysis, does little to clarify this sloppy and con-
fusing area of the law.
276 Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *12
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996).
27 Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 506 (Cal. 1993).
271 Id. at 523.
271 See, e.g., Joseph A. Ciucci, Note, Defining the Permissible Uses of Objecting
Members' Agency Dues: Solution Any Clearer After Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n?, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 89, 107-08 (1992).
"8 Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir.
1999).
28 Id. (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 518 (1991)).
" Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1037.
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A. Germaneness: Education as a Legitimate Interest
In the first prong of its analysis, the Seventh Circuit set a
standard of legitimacy for the Regents' interest to justify com-
pelled funding.283 However, while it announced this standard,
the court did not address the legitimacy of the Regents' inter-
est in compelling funding because it noted that the objecting
students had not claimed that the Regents lacked a legitimate
interest.284 Instead, without discussing the "legitimacy" of the
Regents' interest the court skipped to the question of "ger-
inaneness" and found that the compelled funding was not "ger-
mane" to the broad interest in educationY5 This conclu-
sion did not rest on an evaluation of the government's
interest in education or its power to insure the achievement of
its interest. The court determined that the compelled fund-
ing was not "germane" to the Regents' interest in education
based not on "legitimacy," but on the ethereal and broad
nature of education.286
The court did not determine more narrowly whether the
appropriation of mandatory fees to political and ideological
student organizations was germane to a university chartered
to disseminate and apply knowledge in "the search for
truth."287 Instead, the court found the interest in education
too broad to justify the compulsion of speech. 28 The court
based the broadness of the Regents' interest in education on
the precedent of Abood and its progeny.289 In relying on the
labor and bar contexts, the court failed to recognize its own
musing that "everything is in a sense educational."21 This
recognition of the broadness of education should not have lik-
ened Southworth to Abood and Keller, but should have distin-
guished it instead. As the Regents had argued, the interest of
" See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 724 (7th Cir. 1998).
284 See id.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 725.
287 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 36.01(2) (West 1998).
2' See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725.
289 See id.
290 Id.
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education can be broader than the limited interests of the bar
or a union, and thus, may encompass a larger array of
"germane" activities.29'
None of the decisions in this context that employ the ger-
maneness analysis defines the word "germane." The American
Heritage College Dictionary defines the word "germane" as
"being both pertinent and fitting."2 2 In assessing the "ger-
maneness" of the Regents' interest in education, the court
ignored the meaning of the word "germane." The court deter-
mined that the funding of political and ideological groups was
not "germane" to the Regents' interest in education because the
groups were open to students and non-students and that such
funding was not necessary to the groups' existence.'
First, the fact that the political and ideological organiza-
tions were open to both students and non-students does not
change their pertinence to the UWM's educational mission. By
statute, the UWM is, inter alia, directed "to extend knowledge
and its application beyond the boundaries of its campus-
es . . "294 This extension of knowledge would be impossible
without interaction between student and non-student groups.
Second, it is not clear why the court found the necessity of
funding relevant to the question of whether certain appropria-
tions were "germane" to the interest of education. "Germane-
ness," described by the dictionary as "being pertinent and
fitting,"29' does not rely on necessity. Just because the stu-
dent groups may not need funding to exist, one cannot assume
that the funding is not "germane" to the educational mission of
the university. Moreover, even if "germaneness" depends upon
necessity, it is doubtful that these political and ideological
groups could exist to a meaningful extent without a grant from
the mandatory student fees." 6 In his dissent in Smith, Jus-
tice Arabian commented, "[wlithout such funding,... I have
29 See id.; see also Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 520
(Cal. 1993) (Arabian, J., dissenting).24 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 571 (3d ed. 1993).
' Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725.
294 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.01(2) (West 1998).
295 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 571 (3d ed. 1993).
296 See RALPH NADER & DONALD Ross, ACTION FOR A CHANGE: A STUDENTS
MANUAL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZING 33-34 (Grossman Publishers 1971).
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no doubt that the campus would lose much of the diversity
which is its lifeblood."
2 97
Most significantly, these arguments do speak to the legiti-
macy of the interest offered by the Regents, which the object-
ing students had not challenged and which the court originally
said it would not address.
Furthermore, in assessing whether compelled funding was
"germane" to the Regents' interest in education, the court
found that the political and ideological groups only offered
"incidental" educational benefits.118 The groups, the court de-
termined, were primarily concerned with promoting their own
political agendas. 99 By creating this dichotomy between inci-
dental and primary benefits of student groups, the court ne-
glected the judiciary's traditional philosophy of the university
as a "marketplace of ideas.""0 Under this tradition, the focus
would not be the primary motive of the political or ideological
organization, but the educational value of the existence of
another point of view.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit, or perhaps the Regents,
never attempted to narrow the interest of education in order to
make it more palatable for the court to analyze. For example,
if the Regents had argued with reference to its statutorily
enacted mission,'°I there would have been more words and
concepts for the court to employ in its "germaneness" analysis.
This would have been helpful in focusing and limiting the
ethereal and omnipresent nature of education. Moreover, nei-
ther the court nor the Regents proposed, as in Carroll,302 a
narrowing of the ideological and political organizations' activi-
ties in order to make them more "germane" to the university
and to create less of an infringement on the objecting
students' rights.
29" Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 527 (Cal. 1993) (Arabi-
an, J., dissenting).
29 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725.
299 See id.
"' See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United
States v. Associated Press, D.C., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)); see also
infra note 365 and accompanying text.
301 See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 36.01 (West 1998).
232 See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the court's "germaneness" analysis was confused
because it first recognized that the objecting students had not
challenged the legitimacy of the Regents' interest in compelled
funding. By only challenging the use of their own fees to sup-
port political and ideological groups with which they disagreed,
the objecting students were not questioning the "germaneness"
of compelled funding to the Regent's interest in education. If
the objecting students had argued that the compelled funding
was not "germane" to the Regents' interest in education, the
students would have argued against the funding of all political
and ideological groups, including those with which they agreed
and identified. The court's assessment of the broadness of
education referred to the elusive nature and definition of the
interest itself, which in turn referred to the legitimacy it sum-
marily dismissed as unchallenged. In its analysis, the court
blurred the edges between the legitimacy of the interest in
education and the "germaneness" of that interest to the alloca-
tion of mandatory fees.
B. The Justification of the Compelled Funding: Education as a
Vital Interest
In the second prong of the Lehnert analysis the court ad-
dressed whether the compelled fee was justified by a "vital"
policy interest.3 ' Since the Regents had not mentioned this
prong in their brief, the court focused on the Regents' ex-
pressed interest in education and the shared governance of the
university."4 The court should have recognized that educa-
tion is a "vital" interest, even in relation to the allocation of
mandatory fees. Instead, the court determined that the inter-
est in education was "no doubt" vital, but not vital enough to
justify compelled funding.0 5 The court furthered this con-
clusion based on the notion of a "common cause" identified
in Lehnert."'
'" See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727.
3" See id.
3 Id. The court never determined whether the Regents' interest in the shared
governance of the university was a vital interest.
3" See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727-728; see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 521 (1991).
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In Lehnert, the Supreme Court found that union expendi-
tures unrelated to collective-bargaining did not further the
vital policy interests behind agency shop fees because the ex-
penditures caused a dissonance between the goals of the union
and the workers." 7 In essence, the discord instigated by the
expenditures was inimical to the government's interest in labor
peace. In Southworth, the Seventh Circuit described this idea
of the Lehnert Court as the "importance of a common cause for
justifying compelled funding.""' However, the Court's notion
of a "common cause" was ill fit in its application to the tension
of interests presented by Southworth. This misapplication
resulted primarily from the inherent distinction between the
union shop and the university, a distinction the court later
recognized to reject the Regents' free-rider argument."9 Most
significantly, unlike a union, a university does not exist in a
representative capacity.310 Instead, the university is unique
in its ability to enfold contradicting factions and still be
squarely within its purpose. This tension of ideas is integral to
the university setting, whereas such debate could be harmful
to an effective and exclusive representative body.
In Southworth, the Regents' interest in appropriating
objecting students' mandatory fees to political and ideological
organizations was not inimical to its interest in education.
Unlike the goal of "labor peace," the object and legacy of educa-
tion is the debate and opposition of ideas."' While the Sev-
enth Circuit resolved that there may have been a "common
cause" of education between the Regents and the objecting
students, the court found no "common cause" between the
objecting students and the political and ideological organiza-
tions they opposed.312 The court's determination failed to rec-
See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728; see also Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 521.
' Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727.
" See id. at 728.
310 See id. ("The reason a free-rider problem exists in the context of unions,
however, is significant (and in the case of student organizations lacking): In the
case of unions, the government has imposed on unions the duty to fairly represent
all employees . . ").
311 See DAVID MEABON ET AL., A STUDENT ACTIVITY FEE PRIMER: CURRENT RE-
SEARCH ON COLLECTION, CONTROL AND ALLOCATION 21 (1985) ("In conclusion,
courts agree that colleges and universities are arenas where ideas and beliefs,
whether accepted or rejected, should and will challenge each other.").
312 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728. In refuting the existence of a "common cause,"
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ognize that the tension between the objecting students and the
political and ideological groups did not sever a "common cause"
in education. The aim of the UWM was not frustrated by a
tension between the political and ideological values of the
organizations and the objecting students."' 3 Remarkably, this
discord among students does not frustrate, but rather, serves
to further the educational mission of the university. In the
university context, the opposition of beliefs serves to refine
ideas and heighten students' "intellectual, cultural and
humane sensitivities."314
Furthermore, in creating this "common cause" analysis,
the court never reviewed the interest in education separately
from the labor or bar context. The court failed to explore the
cultural values and expectations placed on educational institu-
tions and the "vital" interests they serve for our country as a
whole and for our immediate communities.
C. The Burdening of "Speech": Education as an Important
Interest
In the third prong of its analysis, the court recognized that
a mandatory fee program might incidentally burden students'
speech rights.315 Therefore, the court questioned whether the
specific appropriation to political and ideological groups further
burdened the objecting students' First Amendment speech
rights. 16 With the outcome determined, the court stated
baldly that this added burden could be justified by an impor-
tant governmental interest.317 However, the court confused
the court recognized the antagonistic relationship between the political and ideo-
logical organizations and the objecting students. Id. However, the remainder of the
opinion only addresses the First Amendment rights of the objecting students in
relation to the Regents, never considering the relationship between the organiza-
tions and the objecting students (or the effect of the holding on the organizations'
existence).
"' In fact, many students involved in the political and ideological organizations
challenged by the objecting students probably opposed the ideas espoused by other
organizations based on their own deeply held beliefs. This give and take in the
equal funding of viewpoints allows the university to encourage robust debate. Sur-
prisingly, the court never discusses how widely the fees are distributed and how
more viewpoints could be represented if more students simply applied for funding.
314 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.01(2) (West 1998).
311 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 729.
316 See id.
317 See id. ("This prong recognizes that any time the government forces individu-
[Vol. 65: 2
SOUTH WORTH V. GREBE
the standard by reversing the appropriate line of questioning.
The court did not first consider whether there was an added
burden on the objecting students, then whether the added
burden could be justified by an important governmental inter-
est. Instead, the court first assumed arguendo that an impor-
tant government interest existed, then determined whether
there was an added burden on the objecting students. 8' This
reversed line of reasoning never discussed whether the Regents
truly had an important governmental interest and only ad-
dressed the added burden on the objecting students.
The court only mentioned the "important" governmental
interest standard in two brief sentences. 19 Once the court
established that the added burden could be justified by an
important governmental interest, the court provided: "Assum-
ing there is a vital governmental interest in funding (which we
have concluded that there is not), the question then becomes
whether a specific expenditure adds to the burden on speech
inherent in the mandated funding of the organization in the
first instance."2 ' Here, the court replaced the "important"
standard with the "vital" standard of the second prong. Cer-
tainly, a "vital" standard is more stringent than an "important"
standard. Thus, the court transposed the standards and
settled for its assessment in the second prong that the
Regents' interest was not "vital," when the interest could still
have been "important."
With a transposed standard, the court's backward order of
analysis discounted the Regents' interest, whether it need be
vital or merely important, because it never asked whether the
effected compulsion could be justified by the interest in educa-
tion. The court, instead, measured the degree of the burden on
the objecting students based upon the "extent and source" of
the students' objections.2 ' The court found an extreme bur-
den on the objecting students since their disagreement
als to fund private organizations, a burden on free speech and association may
incidentally result, but that burden may be justified by an important governmental
interest.").
318 See id.
319 Id.
320 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 729.
321 Id.
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stemmed from "deeply held religious and personal beliefs."322
However, the court never then determined whether the
Regents' interest in education was important, and thus, could
justify this added burden on the objecting students'
speech rights.
In failing to meaningfully assess the Regents' interest in
appropriating funds to political and ideological groups, the
court had a thumb on the scale in favor of the objecting stu-
dents. In assessing only the extent of the burden on objecting
students, the court not only failed to question the importance
of the Regents' interest in education as a justification for the
appropriations, the court also overlooked the democratic pro-
cess in place at the UWM.
The court quickly discounted the Regents' argument that
the university's democratic process distinguished Southworth
from Abood and Keller.3" The Regents argued that the object-
ing students could work through the democratic process, which
was a distinction from Abood not mentioned in Keller.2 4
While the teachers in Abood, as non-union employees, did not
have the union's democratic process available to them, the
lawyers in Keller did. 5 The court rejected the Regents' argu-
ment because the Keller Court never addressed this distinc-
tion.326 Moreover, the court dismissed the power of the
Regents' argument because objecting students, if elected, would
-not be able to "de-fund organizations whose viewpoints they
opposed."327 In its analysis the court wrongfully precluded the
Regents from raising an important assertion merely because
the court and counsel failed to recognize the argument
in Keller.
It is significant that the UWM has a democratic process in
place because the objecting students could have (1) campaigned
to elect representatives whose views aligned more closely with
their own, (2) sought funding for their own groups which op-
posed the views or values expressed by the groups with which
they disagreed, (3) sought to change the university's policy in
322 Id.
32 See id. at 732.
..4 See id.
31 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732.
326 See id.
32' Id. at 732 n.14.
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granting funding from mandatory fees to political and ideologi-
cal groups, or (4) sought to change the university's policy re-
garding how the political and ideological groups may expend
funds granted to them through mandatory fees. In a footnote,
the court mentions the futility of what it sees as the only avail-
able option to the objecting students within the democratic
process: trying to de-fund the groups with which they dis-
agree.3" Thus, instead of working within the university's own
legislative process, the objecting students brought an action in
federal court to de-fund political and ideological organizations
at a state university.
The court found the Regents' democracy argument flawed
based on the notion that the First Amendment rights of minor-
ity individuals trump the democratic process.329 While this
maxim is well founded in terms of the positive speech rights of
the First Amendment, it is neither firmly grounded nor self-
evident that the negative First Amendment rights of a minori-
ty trump the democratic process. Clearly, in terms of the posi-
tive rights of the free speech clause, a minority group of objec-
tors may speak out or protest without invading the democratic
majority. However, while this democratic majority cannot stop
the minority from exerting their positive speech rights, it is
unclear when a democratic majority can no longer compel the
minority to follow fairly legislated decisions. There is no merit
in the argument that a democratic regime does not at times
force minority objectors to fund projects or values with which
they disagree-for example, taxes.33 Essentially, it is unclear
at what point the negative speech rights of the minority are
truly implicated by the majority's fairly elected decisions.
More concretely, based on the facts in Southworth, the
Regents' allocation of mandatory fees only affected the object-
ing students indirectly because they claimed that their nega-
tive speech rights were implicated by the allocation of their
mandatory fees to fund political and ideological groups. In
other words, the objecting students were not, and did not claim
to be, forced to join, or even participate, in the activities of the
groups with which they disagreed.331 Unlike the government
"' See id.
" See id. at 732.
"' See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Ind. v. Packard, 741 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1984).
"t The Ninth Circuit adopted this argument in Rounds, finding that the ob-
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forcing an individual to say the pledge of allegiance or post a
state motto on her license plate,332 the expenditure of the
mandatory fees did not force the objecting students to sub-
scribe to any belief, and it did not represent that the objecting
students agreed with all the beliefs of all of the groups funded.
The students were not compelled, as in Barnette, to "confess by
word or act" belief in any message or viewpoint.333
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit relied on Lehnert, which in
turn relied on Wooly v. Maynard, to demonstrate that the First
Amendment protects the objecting students from the "type of
invasion" that "foster[s their] adherence to an ideological point
of view.... "334 This strong language is entirely out of con-
text when applied to the Regents' mandatory fee system.
Through its appropriation of fees the Board of Regents was not
indoctrinating students to adhere to a set of beliefs or values.
It was actually quite the opposite, as the Regents did not re-
quire that the objecting students attend the political and ideo-
logical organizations' meetings or events. The appropriation
of the fees served only the purpose of ensuring the expres-
sion of diverse viewpoints,335  not the indoctrination of
specific viewpoints.
In addition, more practically, when the court focused on
the burden on the objecting students, it failed to recognize the
meager pro rata share of each objecting students' fees appro-
priated to each political and ideological organization. Each
individual objecting student was forced to pay no more than a
few cents per semester to each political or ideological organiza-
tion.336 This meager amount of money allowed the UWM stu-
dents to host and encourage diverse debate. Likewise, given
jecting students were not compelled to become members of, or speak for, OSPIRG
EF, the organization with which they disagreed. See Rounds v. Oregon State Bd.
of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 1999).
See supra Part I.A.
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
See Lemert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1991); see also
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 724 (7th Cir. 1998).
36 See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at
*7-*8 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996). In the first semester of 1996-1997 academic year,
only $6.48 of the students' $190.45 fee was distributed to the GSSF. See id. at *8.
Likewise, of the $190.45 semi-annual fee, only $4.63 was distributed to the ASM.
See id. Thus, each student paid a little over $10.00, which was in turn distributed
to some hundred organizations.
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that the fees were appropriated to groups representing a di-
verse array of viewpoints, the body of organizations that each
individual student supports with this small fee will likely even
out between groups with which she both agrees and disagrees.
Further, so long as mandatory fees are allocated to stu-
dent groups on a content neutral basis-that is regardless of
the views they espouse-there is a valid argument that a limit-
ed public forum has been created by the University. 37 The
court did not accept the Regents' argument that the challenged
student groups were not, and were not perceived to be, the
voice of all students. The court overlooked the fact that the co-
existence of all of the groups funded by mandatory student
fees, not just the eighteen with which the objecting students
disagreed, created a diverse forum for the interaction of
ideas-not unlike the fora created by the student newspapers in
cases like Kania3 5 or even Rosenberger v. Rector,339 one of
the ADF's very own battles.
In conclusion, the Regents' allocation of mandatory student
fees to political and ideological organizations required the court
to balance the objecting students' right to be free from com-
pelled speech against the Regents' interest in maintaining the
appropriations for their educational value.340 Utilizing an
unclear standard of review, relying on a line of labor law cases
ill-fit in the university context, neglecting to recognize educa-
tion as a vital interest, disregarding the university's own
means by which the burden on objecting students' rights could
be limited, and failing to recognize the adverse effect of its
holding on the student organizations, the court found that the
burden on the objecting students was not justified by the Re-
' The Ninth Circuit embraced the university as a limited public forum in
Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1038-40 n.5 (9th Cir.
1999).
' See supra notes 91-95.
3" 515 U.S. 819 (1995); see supra note 90. In Rosenberger, the Court required a
public university to consider the funding of a religious student newspaper, neutral
to its views, because the university funded other newspapers representing diver-
gent viewpoints, thus, creating a public forum. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840.
Essentially, the ADF wanted deeply religious students to "have their cake and eat
it too"-i.e., religious campus papers should be considered for funding because of
the right to freedom of speech and association, despite the separation of church
and state; yet, all groups that offend religious students' beliefs should not be fund-
ed because of the religious students' freedom of speech and association.
"' See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732.
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gents' interest in education. This balancing test weighed heavi-
ly the objecting students' underlying claim to "freedom of
mind," which yielded the paradoxical result of a more uniform
and colorless educational institution. The seminal negative
speech rights cases invalidated indoctrination because "compul-
sory unification of opinion only achieves the unanimity of the
graveyard." 4' Underlying this powerful language is the no-
tion that the First Amendment protects diversity of thought.
Unfortunately, and paradoxically, the decision in
Southworth repudiates the precedent on which it relies by
threatening the exchange of disparate political and ideological
speech at public universities.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF SOUTHWORTH
While the Seventh Circuit properly limited the district
court's injunctive order, its decision in Southworth effectively
abrogates a system of mandatory fee distribution designed to
foster the exchange of diverse viewpoints. While the court held
it unconstitutional to appropriate objecting students' fees to
groups with which they disagreed, the practical implications of
researching which students agree and disagree with which
groups effectively eliminates the program. Administratively, it
is inefficient and costly for the Regents to sift out and match
up objectors and non-objectors to each political and ideological
group funded through the mandatory fee program.342 Accord-
ingly, the Regents most efficient and cost-effective way of com-
plying with the court's decision is to cease funding political and
ideological groups altogether.343 Forced to rely on donations,
many of these politically and ideologically active groups will
waste most of the short school year trying to secure fund-
ing.3" Moreover, given the financial burden already present-
ed by exorbitant college tuition bills, students will be discour-
3. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
342 The court rejected the Regents' administrative efficiency argument. See
Southworth, 151 F.3d at 733.
" See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 519 (Cal. 1993)
(Arabian, J., dissenting).
314 See NADER & ROSS, supra note 296, at 34 ("Instead of obtaining educational
benefits by performing substantive research, students would be continually forced
to devise ways of raising money.").
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aged from actively participating in extracurricular groups that
require them to pay dues.345 In effect, political and ideological
organizations will go out of print, withering the extracurricular
debate so vital to the university and the democracy it serves.
In the aftermath of the Seventh Circuit's decision, there
are, however, arguments other universities might make, or
actions they might take, in order to maintain the appropriation
of mandatory student fees to organizations like the eighteen
challenged by the objecting students in Southworth. 6
First, since Southworth held, without any discussion of its
basis, that the Regents could not appropriate mandatory activi-
ty fees to private organizations, a university may argue that
the political and ideological groups funded through the appro-
priation of student fees are public organizations. In fact, in its
compliance with the Southworth court's decision, the Wisconsin
Regents could argue that the campus groups, including the
eighteen cited in the law suit, are not private organizations.
These student groups are creatures of the public university,
and their funding is derived from public money. Moreover, the
groups are not exclusive in nature, a characteristic attributed
to private organizations, instead, they are opened to all
interested individuals.
The plaintiffs, or objecting students, might argue in re-
sponse that the political and ideological groups are private if
they mirror or elect the name of a larger private organization
that exists outside the university campus. While it is un-
clear whether this would nominate the organization a pri-
vate one, universities could nevertheless counsel their stu-
dent organizations to adopt different names without compro-
mising their missions.
Second, universities, including perhaps the Regents in its
compliance with the Southworth decision, may likewise argue
" The amount of dues it would cost each interested student to participate in
an organization would by far exceed the costs of submitting to a fee system that
spreads costs over, and benefits, the entire university population.
' In fact, a committee of students and administrators at UWM defined two op-
tions for compliance with the Southworth ruling. The committee proposed to define
which groups are political and ideological and then to let objecting students opt
out of funding those groups. Alternatively, the committee proposed to allow stu-
dents to opt out of paying for all groups. See Gwen Carleton, UW Weighs Options
in Fee Suit, THE CAPITAL TMIES, Oct. 29, 1998 at 4A, available in 1998 WL
14536280.
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that the student groups do not engage in political or ideological
activities. In Keller, the Supreme Court warned that "those
activities having political or ideological coloration... will not
always be easy to discern.""4 Universities may take advan-
tage of the fuzzy line between what constitutes and does not
constitute a political or ideological activity. Many of the eigh-
teen groups cited by the objecting students could more aptly be
termed "cultural" or "ethnic" groups. For example, the Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual Campus Center could argue that their activities
are neither political nor ideological in nature, but instead, the
group exists as a social and support network. Likewise, a
group like the Madison AIDS Support Network could argue
that their activities are neither political nor ideological in na-
ture, but instead, that their activities include health education
and disease prevention.
Moreover, a student organization of a multifarious nature
could argue that only some of its activities are political and
ideological and utilize the funding from mandatory fees to
sponsor its other events. For example, the Campus Women's
Center could use its funding to maintain health education and
support networks, yet solicit funding from elsewhere to support
its political activities. However, many of the groups the object-
ing students cited in Southworth are at "extreme ends of the
spectrum,"4 ' and with clearly political and ideological mis-
sions, they cannot colorably claim otherwise.3 '
Third, a university faced with a challenge to the expendi-
ture of mandatory student fees to fund political and ideological
groups might offer a more narrow interest than "education" to
justify the compelled funding. Since the Seventh Circuit found
that the Regents' interest in education was too broad to be
"germane" to the compelled funding, in the future a university
should argue its interests with reference to its statutorily en-
" Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990); see also Robert M.
O'Neil, Student Fees & Student Rights: Evolving Constitutional Principles, 25 J.C.
& U.L. 569, 579 (1999) (discussing the difficulty in determining which groups are
"political and ideological" in nature).
"' Keller, 496 U.S. at 16.
"' Further, as suggested by Rounds, the organization could "bisect political and
educational functions" so as to limit the use of its funding to educational activi-
ties. Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir.
1999). This, however, presupposes that the determination of educational and politi-
cal functions is easily made. See, e.g., infra note 353.
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acted mission statement. For example, if the Regents had ar-
gued that their interests reflected those set forth in § 36.01 of
the Wisconsin statute, the broad and ethereal nature of "edu-
cation" may have been circumvented. While the language of
the statute is still rather lofty and broad, it offers the court
more narrow notches and phrases in which to apply its "ger-
inaneness" analysis."' Likewise, in Carroll, SUNY Albany
advanced "three distinct reasons" for appropriating mandatory
fees to NYPIRG. 51 These specific reasons gave the Second
Circuit more narrow facets in which to focus its analysis and
might explain the case's more diplomatic outcome.
Fourth, also in consonance with the Second Circuit's com-
promise in Carroll, a university might enact a policy that re-
quires political and ideological student organizations to spend
as much money on activities on campus as they receive from
the university through mandatory fees. 52 This policy would
guarantee that objecting students like those in Southworth
only fund activities that occur on campus and encourage the
exchange of ideas for primarily educational benefits. Further,
this policy would limit the objecting students' contributions to
lobbying and marches because the organizations would have to
raise their own funding to participate in such activities. In
effect, under this policy, the university could substantially cur-
tail the infringement on objecting students' negative speech
rights and make the educational benefits of the organizations
less incidental to their political agendas. 3
... For example, the interest of education would have been narrowed if the
Board of Regents had argued that one of its interests in appropriating mandatory
fees to political and ideological organizations was "to extend knowledge and its
application beyond the boundaries of its campuses." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.01(2)
(West 1998). Likewise, some of the Seventh Circuit's focus on certain factual find-
ings, like the fact that the groups were opened to students and non-students,
could have been diverted. In addition, the need for legislative deference would
have been more pronounced.
... Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 999 (2d Cir. 1992). In Carroll, the univer-
sity advanced the following three interests: (1) promotion of extracurricular activi-
ties, (2) the encouragement of "participatory civics training", and (3) the instigation
of "robust campus debate on a variety of public issues." Id.
352 See id. at 1002.
" See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 519 (Cal. 1993)
(Arabian, J., dissenting) ("The dichotomy between 'educationally beneficial' and
'ideological' speech is a false and pernicious one.").
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Fifth, a university might be tempted to include the activity
fee in the amount of tuition. While it would be unclear how a
challenge to the expenditures would come out under this
changed set of facts, it is not an intellectually honest way for a
university to circumvent the First Amendment issues inherent
in a mandatory fee system.354
Lastly, though the argument was rejected by the district
court355 and was not addressed by the Seventh Circuit, a uni-
versity faced with a challenge similar to the Regents in
Southworth might make the argument that it is a "public fo-
rum." Essentially, the university would argue, as in the news-
paper cases, that it grants funding to political and ideological
campus groups because, as a public forum, it must grant mon-
ey on a viewpoint neutral basis.355 The district court rejected
' See NADER & ROSS, supra note 296. Even in this pamphlet, the authors and
advocates for PIRGs admit that mandatory fees, while guaranteeing funding, are
"shamelessly coercive." Id. at 35. To lessen this coercion, the authors suggest a
refund system for the minority objectors. See id. at 36. However, to remain consis-
tent in its agency shop analysis, the Seventh Circuit had to reject this suggestion
because of Ellis, which held that a union's system of refunding political and ideo-
logical expenditures was unconstitutional. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline
and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes, 466 U.S.
435, 444 (1984); see also Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 733 (7th Cir. 1998).
See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at
*32 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996). The district court found that,
fiun this case, there are clearly many instances where portions of the
segregated fee are being used to create a forum for student organizations
to express their views. However, there are a number of situations where
portions of the segregated fee are being used clearly to fund political or
ideological activity, not to provide a forum for the free exchange of ideas.
Id.
356 See, e.g., Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp 149 (D. Neb. 1973) (public
university did not violate freedom of association by financing a student newspaper
and a speakers program with mandatory student fees because the institution did
not advocate for the philosophy espoused by the paper or the speakers), affd, 478
F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973); Good v. Associated Students, 86 Wash. 2d 94 (1975)
(public university may constitutionally fund political and ideological student groups
with student activities fees as long as the school does not promote any particular
viewpoint). For a detailed discussion of the argument that a university is a public
forum in the mandatory fee context, see Janine G. Bauer, Note, The Constitution-
ality of Student Fees for Political Student Groups in the Campus Public Forum:
Galda v. Bloustein and the Right to Associate, 15 RUTGERs L.J. 135 (1983); Kari
Thoe, Note, A Learning Experience: Discovering the Balance Between Fees-Funded
Public Fora and Compelled-Speech Rights at American Universities, 82 MINN. L.
REv. 1425 (1998); William Walsh, Comment, Smith v. Regents of the University of
California: The Marketplace is Closed, 21 J.C. & U.L. 405 (1994); Carolyn Wiggin,
Note, A Funny Thing Happens When You Pay For A Forum: Mandatory Student
[Vol. 65:2
SOUTHWORTH V. GREBE
this argument because it appeared that there were circum-
stances where the funding from the mandatory fees was not
used by political and ideological organizations to create a fo-
rum for speech. In Southworth, the Seventh Circuit did not
squarely address the public forum argument, but the Ninth
Circuit in Rounds embraced the doctrine, distinguishing
Rounds from Southworth on that ground."5 7 It is unclear how
such an argument will fare in the future-hopefully the Su-
preme Court will clarify this area in its review of the Seventh
Circuit decision. It can be stated with certainty, however, that
a university's stress on the neutrality of the fund-granting
process, and the university's encouragement that groups repre-
sent more than one side of a contentious issue, could weigh
heavily if clearly argued. In making a public forum argument,
the university must demonstrate that- the aggregate of the
groups, not each individual group, or all the groups with which
the objecting students disagree, together create a forum for
diverse expression.5 '
Thus, there are still plausible arguments that a university
can raise, or actions a university can take, that may help it to
survive a First Amendment challenge to the appropriation of
mandatory fees to fund political and ideological campus organi-
zations. Presently, the ADF has two nearly identical pending
actions in both Minnesota and Ohio.359 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari in Southworth to determine
"[wihether the First Amendment is offended by a policy or
program under which public university students must pay
mandatory fees that are used in part to support organizations
that engage in political speech."8 ' The Supreme Court's deci-
sion will help further define the future of, and the arguments
to be made for, the appropriation of mandatory student activity
fees to fund political and ideological student organizations.
Fees to Support Political Speech at Public Universities, 103 YALE L.J. 2009 (1994).
... See Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1040 n.5
(9th Cir. 1999).
3s, See MEABON ET AL., supra note 311, at 21.
9 See Brakken, supra note 4, at 13; ONeil, supra note 347, at 569.
3' 119 S. Ct. 1332 (Mar. 29, 1999).
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CONCLUSION
In Southworth, the Seventh Circuit did not clearly articu-
late a standard for reviewing the constitutionality of the alloca-
tion of mandatory fees to fund political and ideological student
organizations. It is unclear whether the Regents' interest in
education had to be 'legitimate," "vital" or "important" to justi-
fy the burden on the objecting students' First Amendment
rights. Nevertheless, by the most stringent of the recited stan-
dards, education, especially as set forth in the UWM's statuto-
ry mission, is a "vital" interest which may justify the funding
of political and ideological groups with mandatory fees.
The Southworth decision raises fundamental questions for
universities, students, and courts to consider. For example,
does the allocation of money, without any other act, amount to
speech?3 ' Does it amount to association? Were the objecting
students, by solely paying a mandatory fee, compelled to asso-
ciate with, and speak for, groups with which they disagreed?
Furthermore, Southworth has powerful political signifi-
cance because it demonstrates how a conservative and reli-
gious legal organization can utilize the discourse of individual
rights to judicially effect a de-funding of viewpoints which it
opposes. Should judges heed these political underpinnings not
argued or briefed by lawyers who present such cases? Is this
judicial activism appropriate in a federal court to effect
changes at a localized university?" 2 Does this model of litiga-
tion empower those with the economic upper hand to de-fund
viewpoints with which they disagree? After all, the objecting
students did not seek out the lawyers at the ADF to recapture
the couple of dollars they each indirectly lost when the Regents
appropriated their mandatory fees.363
361 See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85
YALE L.J. 1001, 1019 (1976).
" For example, similar cases have heralded judicial deference to the academic
judgment of the university. See, e.g., Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149 (D.
Neb. 1973) ("Our states, through their colleges and universities, must retain the
freedom and flexibility to put before their students a broad range of ideas in a
variety of contexts. The wisdom or political desirability of the specific route chosen
is not a question to be determined by the courts."), affd, 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir.
1973).
" The ADF devoted more than $500,000 to the Southworth lawsuit. See
Brakken, supra note 4, at 13.
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The Seventh Circuit chilled robust student debate by hold-
ing that the funding of political and ideological groups through
the mandatory fee program violated the objecting students'
negative speech rights. Without funding, many of the political
and ideological groups will not survive. Public universities will
"lose much of the diversity which is [their] lifeblood.""' Con-
sequently, the court's holding will atrophy the interactive,
extracurricular debate so central to the university and the
democracy it serves. Justice Brennan commented, "The class-
room is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues... '" In Southworth, the Seventh Cir-
cuit chilled the student debate so integral to the perfection of
truth, an aim of both the UWM's mission and the guarantees
of the First Amendment.
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'" Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 527 (Cal. 1993) (Arabi-
an, J., dissenting).
3" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United
States v. Associated Press, D.C., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
'" The mission statement of the Regents of the University of Wisconsin con-
cludes, "[blasic to every purpose of the system is the search for truth." WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 36.01(2) (West 1998). This goal of "truth" underlies not only the UWM
system, but also the First Amendment guarantees of the United States Constitu-
tion. See JOHN B. HARRER, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 2, 3 (1992).
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